Imperfect competition à la Negishi also with fixed costs by Pierre Dehez et al.
Imperfect Competition ` al aNegishi,
also with Fixed Costs∗
Pierre Dehez1, Jacques H. Dr` eze2 and Takashi Suzuki3
December 2002
Abstract
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This paper is a modest contribution to the challenging topic of general equilib-
rium under imperfect competition and non-convex technologies. The topic is
important because ﬁxed costs and increasing returns to scale – hence, barriers
to entry and concentrated production – are a major source of market power.
Currently available results are meager. Without attempting to review these,
we note that some models - e.g. Novshekand Sonnenschein (1978) or Hart
(1979) – deal with many ﬁrms tat are or become small relative to the aggregate
economy. In contrast, others – e.g. Heller (1993) – concentrate on a single
monopolist embedded in an otherwise competitive economy. Others still - e.g.
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987, section IV) – rely on speciﬁc models endowed
with strong symmetry properties. In contrast, we introduce a methodological
approach that holds promises of substantial generality, comparable to that of
competitive analysis – even if we do not exploit these promises fully here.
Our approach builds on two main contributions: (i) the perceived-demand
approach to monopolistic competition, introduced in the seminal paper by
Negishi (1961); (ii) the pricing-rules approach to ﬁrm behaviour, introduced
in the seminal paper by Dierker, Guesnerie and Neuefeind (1985) and applied
to competitive-like equilibrium under non-convex technologies by Bonnisseau
and Cornet (1988), Dehez and Dr` eze (1988a,b).
The motivation for adopting the perceived-demand approach is twofold.
First, it simpliﬁes the general equilibrium analysis, a welcome feature given the
analytical diﬃculties introduced by non-convexities. Second, it is in our opin-
ion more realistic, in many situations, than the alternative, objective-demand
approach. Endowing ﬁrms with the ability to compute general equilibrium
reactions to their own market behaviour typically stretches the concept of ra-
tionality far beyond realistic limits.1 Of course, Negishi’s formulation has its
1Negihsi (1972, p. 107) goes as far as as claiming: “It is widely agreed that the only
1own shortcomings, in particular bounded rationality (more on this below) and
failure to model the uncertainties surrounding the estimation of demand elas-
ticities.2 But the gain in realism remains substantial. And the two approaches
are not logically inconsistent, as evidenced by the workof Silvestre (1977) and
Gary-Bobo (1989) who impose that perceived demand curves reﬂect correctly
both the level and the slope of demand at equilibrium. We retain the former
requirement; we have not attempted to incorporate the latter.
Pricing rules provide a powerful tool in modeling ﬁrm behaviour. A pricing
rule associates, with every point on the frontier of a ﬁrm’s production set, the
set of prices at which the ﬁrm is willing to produce at that point. In the case
of smooth convex technologies, the pricing rule of a competitive ﬁrm gives the
unique relative prices at which a production point yields maximum proﬁt.3
This suggests an alternative interpretation of the competitive equilibrium:4
ﬁrms meet demand and adjust prices towards competitive levels – thus by-
passing the contradiction between price setting and competition stressed by
Arrow (1959).
Pricing rules have proved valuable in the general-equilibrium analysis of
economies with non-convex technologies.5 Their use rests on a suitably deﬁned
normal cone to an arbitrary closed set. One example is the workof Dehez and
Dr` eze (1988a,b) on “competitive equilibria with quantity-taking producers”:
(i) producers announce prices for their outputs and satisfy the demand which
materialises at these prices; (ii) these output prices are competitive, in the
demand (supply) function that is relevant in the theory of monopolistic (monopsonic) com-
petition is the perceived, imagined or subjective demand (supply) functions which express
the expectation of the ﬁrm as to the relationship between the price it charges (oﬀers) and
the quantity of its output (input) the market will buy (sell)”. In a footnote, he quotes
Bushaw-Clower, Davis-Whinston, Kaldor and Triﬃn in support of his assertion. Contempo-
rary authors, includingourselves, would be less sang uine...
2For a very modest step in that direction, see Dr` eze (1979).
3These relative prices are given by the normal vector to the production set.
4That alternative interpretation is given in Dehez and Dr` eze (1988a).
5Cf. Journal of Mathematical Economics 17-1(1988) and in particular Bonnisseau and
Cornet (1988), Vohra (1988).
2sense that they are the lowest prices at which the producers remain willing
to satisfy demand. The pricing rules formalise condition (ii). An equilibrium
exists, under otherwise standard assumptions, whether production sets are
convex or not. Two properties of the pricing rules are used in the existence
proof: (P1) the rules are deﬁned by correspondences which are upper hemi-
continuous (u.h.c), convex-, compact- and non-empty valued (c.c.n.v); (P2)
the rules imply non-negative proﬁts.
Under monopolistic competition ` al aNegishi, condition (ii) above must be
modiﬁed to become: (ii’) at these output prices, proﬁts, evaluated on the basis
of the perceived-demand functions, are maximal. Such a condition raises a
speciﬁc diﬃculty. A pricing rule must be deﬁned at every point on the frontier
of the ﬁrm’s production set. For some of these points, there do not exist non-
negative prices sustaining the point as a proﬁt maximising production plan.
For instance, if marginal revenue becomes negative when output y exceeds
some level y, then the set of non-negative prices deﬁned by (ii’) is empty for
all y>y. Yet, the pricing rule should be non-empty valued also there.
To resolve that dilemma, we deﬁne pricing rules under which the prices
stipulated at points where (ii’) is violated cannot prevail at equilibrium. The
rules are deﬁned everywhere, but market equilibrium is not possible every-
where. In this exploratory paper, we assume strict monotonicity of prefer-
ences, so that equilibrium prices are strictly positive. And we impose: (P3)
the rules are such that the ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC) for proﬁt maximisa-
tion under subjectively-perceived demand functions are veriﬁed, or else some
price is non positive. Accordingly, the FOC are veriﬁed at equilibrium.
The resulting equilibria thus have a “bounded rationality” connotation,
because: (i) ﬁrst-order conditions are by nature local, and a local optimum
need not be global; (ii) the demand elasticities need not be perceived correctly.
Item (i) seems inescapable, in the absence of convexity. From a technical view-
3point, existence of several isolated local optima, only some of which are global,
introduces discontinuities in the proﬁt-maximising supply correspondence that
preclude recourse to Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point theorem. From an economic view-
point, global optimisation imposes two unrealistic demands on ﬁrm behaviour,
namely ability to solve a global optimisation problem not always amenable to
standard techniques; and ability to perceive demand characteristics at alloca-
tions arbitrarily remote from experience.
In section 2, we record the immediate result that an equilibrium exists,
under otherwise standard assumptions plus strict monotonicity of preferences
(A1), when ﬁrms hold pricing rules verifying (P1), (P2) and (P3).6 The rest
of the paper deals with primitive assumptions under which such pricing rules
exist.
In order to pave the ground, we ﬁrst develop a pricing-rule approach to
Negishi’s model, under convex technologies (section 3). Negishi (1961, 1972)
assumes that: (i) there is at most one monopolistic competitor in each market;
(ii) perceived demand functions are linear and consistent with observations (in
levels, not necessarily slopes); (iii) the perceived-demand coeﬃcients are con-
tinuous functions of market prices and market net demands to the ﬁrm. We
generalise (i) by allowing every ﬁrm to hold non-competitive net-demand per-
ceptions on all markets but one;7 and we generalise (iii) by allowing the coeﬃ-
cients to depend – continuously – on the full allocation. These generalisations
are of interest in their own right.
But we use three ancillary assumptions:
(A1) every commodity is strictly desired by at least one consumer;
(A2) perceived inverse demand functions are continuous;
(A3) each ﬁrm holds competitive price perceptions for at least one commodity.
6Reminder: pricingrules are an abstract tool of the economist exploringa technical issue;
in particular, they may be devoid of behavioural connotations out of equilibrium.
7This generalisation deﬁnes in what sense we extend Negishi’s approach from monopolistic
to imperfect competition.
4(A1) has been motivated above. (A2) and (A3), already used by Negishi,
are clearly innocuous. Under standard assumptions plus (A1)-(A3), a Negishi
equilibrium exists, when production sets are convex (theorem 3.1).
Turning to non-convex technologies, the challenge is to ascertain the exis-
tence of pricing rules endowed with properties (P1), (P2), (P3). Under linear
demand functions, whether or not properties (P1)-(P3) are mutually consis-
tent depends upon the production set. We give in section 4 a simple example
of a production set for which there does not exist a pricing rule with the de-
sired properties. In the light of that example, we deﬁne a restricted class of
technologies, for which (P1)-(P3) are mutually consistent.
Our restricted class consists of technologies with ﬁxed costs where (A4) ,
for each ﬁrm: (i) the ﬁxed inputs are distinct from the variable inputs or the
outputs; and (ii) the production set is the union of two convex sets, one and
one only of which contains the origin. The extension to an arbitrary ﬁnite
union of convex sets, each allowing for ﬁxed costs, is at hand. Unless one
of these contains the origin, there always exist (local) equilibria where the
ﬁrm is inactive: upper hemi-continuity implies that the pricing rule places no
restriction on admissible prices there (see section 4 for illustration); and there
will exist an equilibrium for the sub-economy from which a given ﬁrm, or set
of ﬁrms, is deleted.8
In section 5, we construct pricing rules verifying (P1)-(P3) for the case
where the ﬁxed inputs consist of a single commodity with competitive price
perceptions. These two restrictions are used for expositional convenience and
are amenable to generalisation. Under standard assumptions and (A1)-(A4),
a Negishi equilibrium exists (theorem 5.1).
8An alternative, introduced in Madden (1984), consists in showingthat an equilibrium
with non-zero production (hence ﬁxed investments) exists, provided the consumption sector
of the economy is large enough. Madden veriﬁes this by replicating the consumption sector
n times and provingthe existence of a ﬁnite integ er n such that, ∀ n ≥ n, the economy
replicated n times admits an equilibrium with positive production. The same route could
be followed here.
5Our excuse for introducing property (i) is simple: it holds trivially when-
ever ﬁxed costs correspond to investments in facilities giving access to supe-
rior operating technologies. Because investments precede operations in time,
the ﬁxed inputs are automatically separated from variable inputs and outputs
through time indices.9 Thus, our speciﬁcation covers in particular all the cases
where increasing returns result from ﬁxed investments; that is, it covers many
(most?) interesting cases.
2 Existence of Equilibria with Pricing Rules
Following Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988)10 or Dehez and Dr` eze (1988a), here-
after DD, to which we refer for details, consider an economy with   commodi-
ties, n producers and m consumers. Producer j is characterised by a produc-
tion set Y j, a closed subset of R  such that Y j+R 
− ⊂ Y j (free disposal)11 and
Y j ∩R 
+ = {0} (absence of free production, possibility of inaction). Consumer
i is characterised by:
- a consumption set Xi, a closed subset of R , convex and bounded below;
- a preference relation   ∼ i on Xi, complete, continuous and convex;12
- an initial endowment ωi in the interior of Xi;
- shares in ﬁrm proﬁts θi =( θi1,···,θin) ≥ 0, Σi θij =1 ,j=1 ,···,n.
It is further assumed that, ∀ k ∈ R , the set
{(y1,···,yn) ∈ Π Y j | Σ yj ≥ k} is bounded ⊂ R n,
9An interestingset of technolog ies close to our class consists of ex ante convex technologies
with ﬁxed costs ex post. Under incomplete markets, these technologies may lead to second-
best eﬃcient departures from marginal cost pricing in some states, as suggested in Dr` eze
(2001, section 3.3).
10Bonnisseau and Cornet do not impose non-negative proﬁts, only bounded losses; but the
rules of income formation for households do not embody limited liability of shareholders.
11Alternatively stated, Y
j is “comprehensive”.
12DD assume non-satiation; we substitute (A1) for that requirement.
6implying that the set of feasible allocations
Z = {(x1,···,x m,y1,···,yn) ∈ ΠXi × ΠY j|Σxi ≤ Σωi +Σ yj}
is a bounded set ⊂ R (m+n).
We refer to that set of assumptions as (DD), and we add the following:13
(A1) For each commodity k ∈{ 1,···, }, there exists a consumer i ∈{ 1,···,m},
whose preferences are strictly monotonic with respect to xk :
x>ˆ x with xk > ˆ xk implies x  i ˆ x ∀ x, ˆ x ∈ Xi.
Let
∂Y j := {y ∈ Y j| ∃ˆ y ∈ Y j, ˆ y   y},
ι  := (1,···,1) ∈ R 
+,
S := {v ∈ R 
+| ι v =1 },
S := {v ∈ R  | ι v =1 };
denote by p a price vector in R 
+ and by z =( x1,···,xm, y1,···,yn)a n
allocation in Z.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A pricing rule for ﬁrm jφ j : ∂Y j × Z × R 
+ →Sis a
correspondence assigning to each production plan yj ∈ ∂Y j a set of prices
φj(yj;z,p) ∈S , given the market data (z,p).14
We formalise the assumptions (P1)-(P2) as follows, for each j:
(P1) The correspondence φj : ∂Y j × Z × R 
+ →S , is u.h.c. and c.c.n.v.
(P2) For all p ∈ φj(yj;z,p),p  yj ≥ 0.
As for assumption (P3), it is implicit in the following
Deﬁnition 2.2 An equilibrium with pricing rules is deﬁned by a price vector
p ∈ S and an allocation z ∈ Z such that:
13Vector inequalities are ≥,> ,  . Rows vectors are primed.
14See remark 2.1 below. In DD, φ
j = φ
j(y




j;z,p) is mentioned in footnote 18 there.
7(E1) for each i, xi is   ∼ i - maximal in {xi ∈ Xi | p xi ≤ p ωi +Σ jθij p  yj};
(E2) p   0 and, for each j, p ∈ φj(yj;z,p);
(E3) Σixi ≤ Σiωi +Σ jyj.
Theorem 2.1 Under assumptions (DD), (A1), (P1) and (P2), there exists
an equilibrium.
Proof Follows from existence theorem 2 in DD. All the assumptions there are
retained, and (P1) validates the generalisation from φj(yj)t oφj(yj;z,p).One
only needs to verify that p   0. As noted above, the set of feasible allocations
is bounded in R (m+n). But (A1) implies unbounded demands xi
j (some i)a t
pj ≤ 0, contradicting (E3).
Remark 2.1 DD deﬁne a pricing rule as a correspondence with values in S,
the unit simplex. Careful examination of the proof of their theorem 2 reveals
that our alternative deﬁnition is still conducive to existence. If φj : ∂Y j ×
Z × R 
+ →Ssatisﬁes (P1)-(P2), the result still holds. This mildly surprising
remark, which allows for pricing rules specifying some negative prices, will
prove essential to our analysis in section 3.
Remark 2.2 As noted above, DD assume that the set of feasible alloca-
tions, Z, is bounded. Accordingly, the proof of theorem 2 there relies on the
standard technique of restricting attention to allocations belonging to a com-
pact set. Consequently, we need only verify the properties of pricing rules
over compact sets, in order to invoke theorem 2.1. Although S is not com-
pact, our correspondences φj(y;z,p) will be compact-valued, and the image
in S of a compact set of triplets (y;z,p) is itself compact (Hildenbrand, 1974,
proposition 3, p.24).
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3.1
In order to apply theorem 2.1 to imperfect competition ` a la Negishi, it is nec-
essary and suﬃcient to specify pricing rules that satisfy postulates (P1)-(P2)
and that (i) embody proﬁt maximisation under downward sloping perceived-
demand functions; (ii) entail some non-positive prices at production plans
incompatible with proﬁt maximisation.
At a market allocation (z,p), Negishi (1961, 1972) considers indirect per-
ceived-demand functions deﬁned as
pj(yj;z,p)=Hj(z,p)yj + Kj(z,p), (3.1)
where the matrix Hj(·) is negative semi-deﬁnite.15 The interpretation is that
the r.h.s of (3.1) gives the prices pj at which ﬁrm j expects to be able to trade
the quantities yj, when the market data are (z,p) ∈ Z×S. The vector Kj(z,p)
is such that pj(yj;z,p) ≡ pj (consistency with observations).
Because Hj(·) is NSD, the proﬁt function is concave, and the ﬁrst-order
conditions (FOC) are suﬃcient for global proﬁt maximisation, when Y j is con-
vex. Accordingly, we may use that property in condition (i) above and rephrase
it as (i’) embody the FOC for proﬁt maximisation under the perceived-demand
functions (3.1).
Remark 3.116 We have deﬁned (3.1) with p ∈ S, thus under a speciﬁc price
normalisation. It is well known that an oligopolistic equilibrium is not in-
variant to the choice of a price normalisation. This has been brought out by
15Negishi (1972, p.111) assumes that the matrix H
j has zero entries for commodities of
which ﬁrm j is not the single monopolistic supplier, and owns a negative deﬁnite principal
minor for the other commodities. He invokes gross substitutability of direct demand func-
tions as a justiﬁcation. If the matrix of partial derivatives of the direct demand functions
were negative deﬁnite, with non-positive oﬀ-diagonal elements, then its inverse H would
be negative deﬁnite with all entries non positive – by application of a theorem of Stieltjes
(1886-7).
16We thank an anonymous referee for promptingthis clariﬁcation.
9Bronsard (1971) for the case of monopolies, then by Gabszewicz-Vial (1972)
for the case of Cournot-Nash oligopolistic equilibria. There are two dimensions
to price normalisation – one trivial and one substantive. The trivial dimension
concerns the overall price level. Instead of imposing p ∈ S, one could impose
kp ∈ S,k ∈ R+. This does not aﬀect the real equilibria: relative prices remain
unaﬀected. The substantive dimension is the choice of p ∈ S as contrasted
with, say pi = 1 for some i in L = {1,···, }, or (Σip2
i)=1 , for instance. As
shown in the references above, oligopolistic or monopolistic equilibria are not
invariant to these alternative speciﬁcations. As one transparent illustration
of the unavoidable arbitrariness in the choice of normalisation, let p ∈ S and
recognise that the bearing of that speciﬁcation depends upon the arbitrary
quantity units in which commodities are measured. By inﬂating the quantity
unit of commodity i, one can bring the condition p ∈ S arbitrarily close to
imposing pi =1 , with consequences for equilibrium brought out in the refer-
ences above.17 The normalisation issue is basically the same under perceived-
demand functions as under objective demand-functions: just consider the case
where perceived and objective demands coincide! Thus, the Negishi equilibria
inherit the normalisation-dependence of Cournot-Nash equilibria. The present
paper is no exception.
Returning to (3.1), the fact that p ∈ S does not imply that pj(yj;z,p) ∈ S.
(Thinkabout a single output with inelastic demand and inputs supplied at
constant prices; the output price varies with yj at unchanged input prices, so
that pj  ∈ S for yj  = yj.) But irrelevance of the overall price level requires
17The practical side of the normalisation issue is intriguing, since economic agents in a
market economy are not aware of any price normalisation. But it is suggestive to think about
oligopolistic or monopolistic ﬁrms as pursuing a real (as opposed to nominal) proﬁt motive.
In a monetary economy, they will accordingly deﬂate future (possibly state-contingent) prof-
its by a price index. The weights of individual commodities in the price index play a role
comparable to the quantity units of the previous paragraph. Thus, indices with diﬀerent
weights may lead to diﬀerent oligopolistic equilibria.
10that (3.1) be homogeneous of degree 1 in p. That is, ∀ k ∈ R+ :
pj(yj;z,kp)=Hj(z,kp)yj + Kj(z,kp)
= kHj(z,p)yj + kKj(z,p)=kpj(yj;z,p). (3.2)
The perceived-proﬁt function is
Πj(yj;z,kp)) = y jpj(yj;z,kp)=ky jpj(yj;z,p). (3.3)
The FOC for a maximum of Πj on Y j are again independent of the price level
k. They require existence of a vector qj in the normal cone to Y j at yj,Nj(yj),
such that18
pj(yj;z,kp)+Hj(z,kp)yj = qj. (3.4)
Because Y j is comprehensive convex, qj > 0 for every qj ∈ Nj(yj), and
Nj(yj) ∩ S  = ∅.
In (3.4), the norm of qj is implicitly related to k. Let
qj ∈ Nj(yj) ∩ S, ι qj =1 ,
and write (3.4) as





In order to obtain pj(yj;z,p) ∈S , it is necessary that
λk
k
=1+ι Hj(z,p) yj. (3.6)
This yields the ﬁrst-order conditions in normalised form:
pj(yj;z,p)=qj(1 + ι Hj(z,p)yj) − Hj(z,p)yj
:= qjaj(yj;z,p) − Hj(z,p)yj (3.7)
18See e.g., Clarke (1983), proposition 2.3.1 and corollary to proposition 2.4.3.
11for yj such that aj(yj;z,p) > 0 (see below).
These expressions admit standard interpretations. Looking at the i-th
component of the vector equalities (3.4), for y
j
i > 0( i is an output), the l.h.s.
measures the marginal revenue of y
j



















measures the diﬀerence between the selling price and the marginal revenue, a
negative term under normal circumstances. The same diﬀerence is added to
the marginal cost in the r.h.s. of (3.7); it corresponds there to the monopolistic
markup of price above marginal cost.19
Less familiar is the term 1 + ι Hj(z,p)yj := aj(yj;z,p), which multiplies
qj in the r.h.s. of (3.7). Its presence is due to the fact that qj ∈ S is a
measure of relative, not absolute marginal costs. The additional term scales
marginal cost commensurably with pj. But a new issue arises: is that term
positive? We have argued above that H
j
i (z,p)yj ≤ 0 should be the rule for
an output i “under normal circumstances”. That term is proportional to yj,
and could become large negative for large yj, entailing 1 + ι Hj(z,p)yj < 0.
Because qj > 0,a j(yj;z,p) > 0 is necessary for qjaj(yj;z,p) ∈ Nj(yj), hence
is necessary for (3.7) to represent correctly the FOC.
The interpretation of this issue is straightforward. If y
j
i > 0 is so large
that 1 + ι Hj(z,p)yj < 0, the production plan yj generates negative marginal
revenues “overall”,20 and yj cannot be a proﬁt-maximising production plan.21
19For y
j
i < 0( i is an input), H
j
i measures the diﬀerence between the buyingprice and the
marginal cost of procurement, a positive term under normal circumstances for a monopsonist.








j] = sum of marginal revenues of outputs
and marginal procurement costs of inputs. The sum over commodities of these terms is





i is normally negative for outputs and positive for inputs, a
j(·) < 0 is normally
brought about by negative marginal revenues for outputs.
21At y
j ∈ ∂Y
j, proﬁts increase in a direction pointinginward the comprehensive set Y
j
12(We have already alluded to that situation in section 1.) The pricing rule will
have to specify some non-positive prices at such a yj.
Remark 3.222 The FOC (3.4), hence (3.7), do not embody the requirement
(3.1) that pj = Hj(z,kp)yj+Kj(z;kp). Indeed, that requirement is meaningful
only when pj = kp, a property that holds only at equilibrium, where further-
more k =1 ,p j = p. To repeat, the pricing rule is a technical device used by
the economist to prove existence of equilibria. Consistency requirements need
only be veriﬁed at equilibrium. Such is indeed the case here, because Hj(z,p)
and Kj(z,p) are assumed to verify p = Hj(z,p)yj + Kj(z,p) identically in
z, p and yj consistent with z : at equilibrium, yj = yj enters the deﬁnition of
z =( x1,···,xm,y1,···,yn). Accordingly, at equilibrium, the FOC for proﬁt
maximisation will be satisﬁed, for the normalisation ι p = 1 (see remark3.1
above).
3.2
We now state formally:
(A2) For each j, the mapping (z,p) → Hj(z,p) is continuous, and the matrix
Hj(z,p) is NSD ﬁnite identically in (z,p).
(A3) For each j, the matrix Hj(z,p) owns at least one row with zero entries
identically in (z,p).
Our pricing rule is
φj(yj;z,p)=
 
p ∈ R  |∃q ∈ Nj(y) ∩ S :





Lemma 3.1 Under assumptions (A2) and (A3), the pricing rules (3.8) sat-
isﬁes (P1), (P2) and (P3), with ι p ≡ 1, for yj,z and p in compact sets.
(a direction bringing about production ineﬃciency); thus, y
j is not proﬁt maximising.
22We thank an anonymous referee for promptingthis clariﬁcation.
13Proof We omit the superscript j and, where unnecessary, the reference to
(z,p).
(1) Ad ι p ≡ 1.
ι p = ι q max(0,1+ι Hy) −
ι Hy
max(1,−ι Hy) with ι q =1 ;
If 1 + ι Hy >0,−ι Hy <1, then ι p =1+ι Hy− ι Hy =1 ;
if 1 + ι Hy <0,−ι Hy >1, then ι p =0−
ι Hy
−ι Hy =1 ;
if 1 + ι Hy =0 ,−ι Hy =1 , then ι p =0− ι Hy =1 .
(2) Ad (P1).
For any given (z,p) ∈ Z × S, and for all y in a closed cube in R  with
ﬁnite length, every entry Hiy, i =1 ,···, ,is uniformly bounded; also,
N(y) is closed; so φ is compact-valued. It is convex-valued because N(y)
is convex-valued. It is non-empty by construction. It is u.h.c in y be-
cause
- N(y) is u.h.c in y, max(0,1+ι Hy) is continuous, and so their product
is u.h.c (Hildenbrand, 1974, p.25);
-
−Hiy
max(1,−ι Hy) is continuous in y;
- the sum of these two terms is u.h.c (Hildenbrand, 1974, p.25).
The correspondence φ(y;z,p) is u.h.c in (z,p) forall y, because p is con-
tinuous in H(z,p) and H is continuous by (A2).
(3) Ad (P2).
Proﬁts, Π(y,p)=y p = y q max(0,1+ι Hy) −
y Hy
max(1,−ι Hy), are non-
negative:
- y q ≥ 0 by deﬁnition of N(y), and 0 ∈ Y ;
- −y Hy ≥ 0 since H is NSD (A2).
(4) Ad (P3).
When 1 + ι Hy > 0, the pricing rule implements the FOC (3.7), which
14is equivalent to (3.4) at equilibrium (see remark3.2 above). When 1 +
ι Hy ≤ 0,p i =
−Hiy
−ι Hy and pi ≡ 0 for i such that Hi = 0 (A3).
3.3
Deﬁnition 3.1 A Negishi equilibrium is deﬁned by a price vector p ∈ S and
an allocation z ∈ Z such that:
(E1) For each i, xi is   ∼ i - maximal in
{xi ∈ Xi| p xi ≤ p ωi +Σ jθijp yj};
(E2) For each j, yj maximises locally on Y j
Πj(yj;z,p)=p j(yj;z,p)yj =[ Hj(z,p)yj + Kj(z,p)]  yj;
(E3) Σixi ≤ Σiωi +Σ jyj.
Theorem 3.1 Under assumptions (DD), (A1), (A2) and (A3), if each Y j
is a convex set, there exists a Negishi equilibrium, and the maximum in (E.2)
is global.
Proof Follows from theorem 2.1, remarks 2.1-2.2 and lemma 3.1.
4 A Pricing Rule May not Exist with Fixed Costs
In this section, we provide an elementary example of a production set for which
there does not exist a pricing rule verifying (P1)-(P3) of section 1.
There are two commodities, an output y and an input x, with respective
prices p and r. The production set, also depicted in ﬁgure 1, is deﬁned by:
Y = {(y,x) ∈ R × R− | y ≤ max[0,−(x + c)]}.
15Thus, y ≤ 0 ∀ x ≥− c, y ≤− (x+c) ∀ x ≤− c. The perceived inverse demand
function is here deﬁned, for a ﬁxed (z,p), by
p(y)=p + b(y − y),b<0; r(x)=r.
Proﬁts are




rx if x ≥− c
p(y)y − r(y + c)i f x ≤− c.
The ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximisation, given x ≤− c, is
dΠ
dy
= by + p(y) − r =0 ,p (y)=r − by. (4.1)



















Proﬁts are non-negative, hence maximal at a solution of (4.1), provided
−b−1 ≥ y ≥{ [bc − (b2c2 − 8bc)1/2] / 4b} := ˆ y.
To illustrate, if b = −1, then 1 ≥ ˆ y ≥ 0 for c ≤ 1.
We wish to construct, on the boundary ∂Y of Y, a pricing rule which





2 ≥ 0, or else pr ≤ 0 (P3). In attempting to do so, a
contradiction arises a the point (ˆ y,−ˆ y − c), labeled a in ﬁgure 1. For −1
b ≥
y ≥ ˆ y, the FOC imposes the unique prices given by (4.2). In particular,
ˆ p = p(ˆ y)=
1−by
2 > 0 and ˆ r = r(ˆ y)=
1+by
2 > 0 for ˆ y<−1
b . For ˆ y>y≥ 0, the
FOC yields negative proﬁts, and (P2)-(P3) impose pr ≤ 0 with p ≥ 0,r≤ 0.
16Let yν,ν=1 ,2,···, tend to ˆ y, with yν < ˆ y ∀ ν; and let (pν,rν) ∈ φ(yν), so
that pν ≥ 0,rν ≤ 0. If φ(y) is u.h.c, there exists a limit (p,r) (not necessarily
unique), with p ≥ 0, r ≤ 0. In order for φ(y) to be u.h.c and c.c.n.v at ˆ y,it must
be the case that (pα,r α)=α(ˆ p, ˆ r)+( 1− α)(p,r) belongs to φ(ˆ y) ∀ α ∈ [0,1].
But this allows for strictly positive (pα,r α) diﬀerent from (ˆ p, ˆ r), which violates
(P3). So, there does not exist a pricing rule satisfying (P1)-(P3), in this
example.
This explains why we introduce the restriction that ﬁxed inputs and vari-
able inputs be disjoint sets of commodities.
5 Negishi Equilibria with Fixed Costs
We now prove existence of equilibria ` al aNegishi for a class of technologies
with ﬁxed costs, where for each ﬁrm ﬁxed inputs are distinct from variable
inputs or outputs, and the production set is the union of two convex sets of
which one contains the origin. For simplicity of exposition, we consider a single
ﬁxed input, and a ﬁxed investment threshold. We leave open the extension
to more complex technologies - where for instance ﬁxed investments could be
chosen from some feasible set, each choice giving access to a convex production
set for variable inputs and outputs;23 or where Y is the union of several convex
sets, each allowing for ﬁxed investments.
More speciﬁcally, let f(j) be the index of the ﬁxed input to ﬁrm j, and




−f) where the subscript f stands for f(j).
(A4) For each j, Y j = Y j1 ∪ Y j2, where
Y j1 =
 
yj ∈ R  | y
j




−f ⊂ R −1
 
,
23The extension to several ﬁxed inputs with ﬁxed investment thresholds is straightforward,
but the expository cost exceeds the beneﬁts.
17Y j2 =
 











−f is a closed convex set such that Y
ji






−f ∩ R −1







That is, Y j is the union of two convex sets, one of which (Y j1) stipulates
a “ﬁxed cost” y
j
f ≤− cj, while the other (Y j2) contains the origin.24 Both







reﬂects the elementary fact that a production plan which is feasible without
ﬁxed investments remains feasible with ﬁxed investment. (This is not essential,
but natural.)
(A3’) For each j, the matrix Hj(z,p) owns at least two rows with zero
entries identically in (z,p), one of these being row f.
This imposes competitive price perceptions for the ﬁxed input - a conve-
nient, though not essential speciﬁcation.
The boundary ∂Y j = {yj ∈ Y j |  ∃ ˆ y ∈ Y j, ˆ y   yj} of Y j can be de-




−f and their boundaries ∂Y
ji
−f ⊂ R −1,i=
1,2:







{yj ∈ R  | y
j









{yj ∈ R  | 0 >y
j












To deﬁne a pricing rule φj : ∂Y j × Z × S →S , we can rely on (3.8) for
the ﬁrst and third elements in the union of sets deﬁning ∂Y j; but we need to
extend that speciﬁcation so as to cover the second and fourth elements, while
preserving upper hemi-continuity at y
j
f = −cj and at y
j
f =0 .
24The total cost function implied by (A4) is not convex for c
j > 0. It contains the origin.
Fixed costs, a property of Y
j1, are avoided when y
j ∈ Y
j2.
18Lemma 5.1 Under (A2), (A3’) and (A4), there exist pricing rules verifying
(P1), (P2) and (P3), for y,z and p in compact sets.
Proof The proof is constructive. A suitable pricing rules is deﬁned succes-













The proof applies to an arbitrary ﬁrm, so we omit the superscript j. Sim-
ilarly, we omit explicit reference to (z,p). We write Ni(y−f) for the normal
cone to Y i
−f at y−f and φi
−f(y−f) for the correspondence deﬁned by (3.8) with
q ∈ Ni(y−f) ∩ S.
1. When 0 >y f > −c, then y−f ∈ ∂Y 2
−f. We set pf =0 ,p −f ∈ φ2
−f(y−f);
that is
φ(y | 0 >y f > −c, y−f ∈ ∂Y 2
−f)={p ∈S|pf =0 ,p −f ∈ φ2
−f(y−f)}. (5.1)
Because lemma 3.1 applies to φ2
−f(y−f), it applies to (5.1).
2. When yf < −c, then y−f ∈ ∂Y 1
−f, and we deﬁne:
φ(y | yf < −c, y−f ∈ ∂Y 1
−f)={p ∈S|pf =0 ,p −f ∈ φ1
−f(y−f)}. (5.2)
Again, lemma 3.1 applies to (5.2).
3. When yf = −c, then y−f ∈ Y 1
−f \ (Y 2
−f \ ∂Y 2
−f), and y is eﬃcient in
production if and only if y−f ∈ ∂Y 1
−f. Otherwise, the FOC conditions cannot
be satisﬁed at strictly positive prices, and y cannot be part of an equilibrium.
This provides leeway in the (purely technical) deﬁnition of the pricing rule.
We use that leeway, when y−f  ∈ ∂Y 1
−f, by setting pf = 0 and extending the
correspondence suitably. It is then convenient to distinguish three subcases.
3.1 For y−f ∈ ∂Y 1
−f, set pf ∈ [0,
p 
−fy−f
c ] and p−f =( 1 − pf)ˆ p−f with
ˆ p−f ∈ φ1
−f(y−f); alternatively stated, for some ˆ p−f ∈ φ1








and p−f =( 1− pf)ˆ p−f. This deﬁnes the composition of corre-
spondences:
φ(y | yf = −c, y−f ∈ ∂Y 1
−f)=
 







c +ˆ p 
−fy−f
 
,p −f =( 1− pf)ˆ p−f
 
, (5.3)
which is u.h.c (Hildenbrand, 1974, p.22) and n.c.c.v. To verify convex val-
uedness, let ˆ pi
−f ∈ φ1
−f(y−f),i=1 ,2; and let pi verify pi












. Then, for all λ ∈ [0,1],p λ := λp1 +(1−λ)p2 veriﬁes
pλ
−f =( 1 −pλ
f)ˆ pλ
−f for ˆ pλ
−f = νλˆ p1
−f+(1−νλ)ˆ p2















. Also, the upper bound on pf guarantees p y ≥ 0.
Lemma 3.1 thus applies to the pricing rule (5.3).
3.2 For y−f  ∈ ∂Y 1
−f,y −f ∈ ∂Y 2
−f, let
φ(y | yf = −c,y−f ∈ ∂Y 2
−f)={pf ∈S|p−f =0 ,p −f ∈ φ2
−f(y−f)}. (5.4)
Again, lemma 3.1 applies.
3.3 For y−f  ∈ ∂Y 1
−f ∪ ∂Y 2
−f, the construction of the pricing rule is more
intricate. For given y =( −c,y−f), we deﬁne:
ˆ y1
−f = y−f + ι−fd1 ∈ ∂Y 1
−f,d 1 > 0;
ˆ y2
−f = y−f − ι−fd2 ∈ ∂Y 2
−f,d 2 > 0.
That is, ˆ y1
−f is the intersection of the half-ray y−f + ι−fd1 with ∂Y 1
−f.
The intersection is non empty because Y is closed and {ˆ y ∈ Y |ˆ y ≥ y} is
bounded; it is unique, by deﬁnition of ∂Y 1
−f;ˆ y1
−f is a continuous function of
y, for parallel half rays.
Similar properties hold for ˆ Y 2
−f, since y−f  ∈ ∂Y 2
−f and Y 2
−f ⊃ R −1
− . There
exists ˜ p2
−f = y−f −ι−f ˜ d2 ∈ Y 2
−f (for instance, ˜ y2
−f ∈ R −1
− for ˜ d2 large enough).
If ˜ y2
−f ∈ ∂Y 2
−f, take ˆ y2
−f =˜ y2
−f. Otherwise, there exists (by the reasoning of
the previous paragraph) y2
−f =˜ y2
−f + ι−f ˆ d2 ∈ ∂Y 2
−f, ˆ d2 > 0. Thus, ˆ y2
−f =
y−f − ι−fd2 − ˆ d2 = y−f − ι−fd2, where d2 > 0 because y−f  ∈ Y 2
−f.
20Let
φ(y | yf = −c, y−f ∈ Y 1
−f \ (∂Y 1
−f ∪ ∂Y 2
−f)) = {p ∈S |p−f =0 ,
∃ p1
−f ∈ φ1








d1 + d2 p1
−f +
d1
d1 + d2 p2
−f}. (5.5)
Thus, φ(−c,y−f) is a set of vectors (0,p −f) where p−f is a convex combi-




−f) for ˆ y1
−f, ˆ y2





d1+d2, are declining functions
of the relative distances of y−f from ∂Y 1
−f and ∂Y 2
−f respectively. If yν
−f,ν=
1,2,···, tends to y−f ∈ ∂Y i
−f,i∈{ 1,2}, then 1 − diν
d1ν+d2ν → 1, ˆ yiν
−f → y−f,
and φ(−c, yν
−f) →{ p ∈S|pf =0 ,p −f ∈ φi
−f(y−f)}.
So, the correspondence φ(y) deﬁned by (5.5) is u.h.c – see proposition 5 in
Hildenbrand (1974, p.25). It is clearly compact- and non-empty valued; it is
convex-valued, because the set of convex combinations of elements from two
convex sets is itself convex. So (P1) is veriﬁed by (5.5).
Ad (P2), note that p i
−fˆ yi
−f ≥ 0 for pi
−f ∈S , by construction of φi
−f(ˆ yi
−f),i=
1,2, hence for all p ∈ φ(y) as deﬁned by (5.5), and
p y = p 
−fy−f =
d2
d1 + d2 p 1
−f(y−f − ι−fd1)+
d1




d1 + d2 +
d1d2
d1 + d2 =0 .
So, (P2) is veriﬁed by (5.5). And (P3) is veriﬁed because pf ≡ 0. Thus, lemma
3.1 holds for φ(y) deﬁned by (5.5).
It may also be noted that (5.4) is a special case of (5.5), which could as
well have been deﬁned for y−f ∈ Y 1
−f \ ∂Y 1
−f.
4. When yf =0 ,y −f ∈ Y 2
−f, it is again convenient to distinguish two sub-
cases.
214.1 For y−f ∈ ∂Y 2
−f, let
φ(y | yf =0 ,y −f ∈ ∂Y 2
−f)={p ∈S|∃ˆ p−f ∈ φ2
−f(y−f):
pf ∈ [0,1],p −f =( 1− pf)ˆ p−f}. (5.6)
By the argument spelled out under 3.1 above, lemma 3.1 applies to this cor-
respondence.
4.2 For y−f  ∈ ∂Y 2
−f, let
φ(y | yf =0 ,y −f ∈ Y 2
−f \ ∂Y 2)={p ∈S|pf =1 ,p −f =0 }. (5.7)
Lemma 3.1 now applies trivially.
5. The correspondence φ(y) deﬁned by (5.1)-(5.7) satisﬁes (P1), (P2) and
(P3) on the seven regions – labelled 1, 2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1 and 4.2 – deﬁning
a partition of ∂Y. Accordingly, it satisﬁes (P2) and (P3) everywhere, and it
is c.c.n.v everywhere. To verify upper hemi-continuity at the common bound-
aries of these seven regions, we note the following:
(1) the relevant connections (the common boundaries) concern 1 and 3.2, 1
and 4.1, 2 and 3.1, 3.1 and 3.3, 3.2 and 3.3, 4.1 and 4.2;
(2) 1 and 3.2 rely on the identical pricing rules (5.1) and (5.4);
(3) 1 connects to 4.1 for pf = 0 in (5.6);
(4) 2 connects to 3.1 for pf = 0 in (5.3);
(5) 3.1 connects to 3.3, hence also to 3.2, for pf = 0 in (5.3) with d1 =0i n
(5.5);
(6) 3.2 connects to 3.3 with d2 = 0 in (5.5);
(7) 4.1 connects to 4.2 for pf = 1 in (5.6).
22This completes the proof of lemma 5.1
Theorem 5.1 Under assumptions (DD), (A1), (A2), (A3’) and (A4), there
exists a Negishi equilibrium.
Proof Follows from theorem 2.1, remarks 2.1-2.2 and corollary 5.1.
The pricing rule is summarised in table 1 and illustrated in ﬁgures 2 and
3 for   = 3 : one output 1, one variable input 2 and one ﬁxed input 3. The
technology without ﬁxed costs is linear, for ease of interpretation of the ﬁgure.
Similarly, it is assumed that the matrix H veriﬁes H11 = b<0,H ij = 0 other-
wise. Accordingly, the locus “1+ι Hy = 0” is simply 1+by1 =0 ,y 1 = −b−1. It
is represented by the dashed lines along which the horizontal plane y1 = −b−1
intersects the boundary of the production set. Figure 2 identiﬁes the seven
regions 1, 2, ..., 4.2 of table 1. Figure 3 records the non-positive prices that
implement (P3) when the FOC are not satisﬁed. Only the conditions holding
in the general case are used.
6 Summary
We have investigated the existence of imperfect-competition equilibria ` al a
Negishi under some non-convexities in production. We rely on “pricing rules”,
which have proved useful in earlier workon equilibria with non-convex tech-
nologies. Under our rules, either proﬁts are locally maximal given linear
perceived-demand functions, or else some price is zero or negative. Assum-
ing that all commodities are strictly desired, proﬁts are locally maximal at
equilibrium. (A global maximum is not at hand without convexity.)25
We focus on production sets consisting of the sum of two convex sets, one of
which allows for ﬁxed costs. Our methodology lends itself to generalisations,
25An equilibrium with y
j ∈ ∂Y
j1 could yield lower proﬁts than some element of ∂Y
j2 and
conversely; such global comparisons are not introduced here.
23like a ﬁnite sum of convex sets, each allowing (or not) for ﬁxed costs. In
the light of an example (section 4), we assume that ﬁxed costs (investments)
involve speciﬁc commodities. As an intermediate step, we study existence
of Negishi equilibria under convex technologies. Our assumptions generalise
those of Negishi. We do not retain his requirement of a single monopolistic
competitor in each market. Under extremely general assumptions, Negishi
equilibria exist, both in the convex case and in the presence of ﬁxed costs.
(Competitive equilibria are a special case of Negishi equilibria.)
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26TABLE 1
Case yf y−f ∈ pf p−f
(5.1) 1 0 >y f > −c∂ Y 2
−f 0 φ2
−f
(5.2) 2 < −c∂ Y 1
−f 0 φ1
−f
(5.3) 3.1 = −c∂ Y 1
−f [0,
ˆ p−fy−f
c+ˆ p−fy−f ]( 1 − pf)φ1
−f
(5.4) 3.2 −c∂ Y 2
−f 0 φ2
−f
(5.5) 3.3 −cY −f \ (∂Y 1
−f ∪ ∂Y 2
−f) 0 see (5.5)
(5.6) 4.1 = 0 ∂Y 2
−f [0,1] (1 − pf)φ2
−f
(5.7) 4.2 0 Y 2
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FOC
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